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INTRODUCTION
The cry to “improve patent quality” is heard anywhere patent law-
yers gather and is a centerpiece of many of the political and academic 
establishments’ major reform agendas.1  Indeed, although the mod-
ern patent system is entangled in policy disputes across a huge range 
of issues, the need to improve patent quality is essentially undisputed.2
1 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE 
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 5 (2003), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (offering recommendations designed to 
improve patent quality); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (evaluating the 
current patent system and recommending seven changes to it); Robert Pear, Patent Bill 
Is Bonanza to Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at C1 (reporting views on patent re-
form and quoting the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Director as stating 
that “[w]e are getting more and more unpatentable ideas, worse and worse quality ap-
plications”).  The need for patent-quality reform has also spurred various lobbying 
groups.  See, e.g., Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n, Patent Reform, http://www.ipo.org/ 
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Action_Center&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm& 
ContentID=3361 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009); Patent Fairness Coalition, 
http://patentfairness.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2009); The Coalition for 21st Century 
Patent Reform, Patents Matter, http://patentsmatter.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
2 One prominent critic of efforts to improve patent examination is F. Scott Kieff, 
who argues that a better approach is to move to a “soft-look” examination process.  
F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-
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This is, in a significant sense, unsurprising.  Basic structural facts flag 
the issue quite clearly:  as the amount of patenting activity has grown 
rapidly worldwide, the administrative apparatus of the patent system 
has been strained to its limits, raising urgent concerns about the vi-
ability of its basic mission of evaluating patentability.3  At the same 
time, the substantial costs of inappropriately granting large numbers 
of patents—uncertainty, additional litigation, and perversion of the 
incentives generated by patents themselves—are reasonably well un-
derstood.4  Despite the near-universal agreement surrounding the 
question of patent quality, relatively little attention has been paid to 
the mechanisms that support (and undermine) it.  Improving patent 
quality is generally viewed as an administrative concern—a question of 
funding levels, regulatory process, bureaucratic reform, and so on.5
While there have been many interesting and innovative proposals for 
enhancing patent quality by reforming (even radically) the patent-
prosecution process, less work has been done to identify the underly-
ing mechanisms of patent quality.6
What has largely been lost in this drumbeat for improved patent 
quality is that the modern patent system affirmatively encourages low 
patent quality7—the incentives at work are such that we cannot rea-
sonably expect anything other than very large numbers of low-quality 
patents.  For this reason, virtually all of the proposed reforms directed 
to patent quality are doomed to fail; until we change the incentives 
(and change them quite significantly), the patent-quality problem will 
continue to grow.8
In this Article, I suggest that only by understanding the mecha-
nisms of patent quality—the incentive structure that not only discour-
ages “good” patent behavior but also encourages “bad” patent behav-
ior—will we make any real progress  in improving the situation.  Low 
patent quality, I argue, is not simply the problem of the U.S. Patent 
Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 56-58 (2003) [hereinafter Kieff, Registering Patents];
see also F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation over Second-Window 
Review and Gold-Plated Patents:  When One Size Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1937, 1947-63 (2009) (arguing against a “beefed-up” segregated ex-
amination system in the PTO, and emphasizing the beneficial information learned dur-
ing the patent litigation process).  I explore this approach in more detail infra Part III. 
3 See infra Section II.B. 
4 See infra Section I.B. 
5 See infra Section III.A. 
6 See infra Section III.B. 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See infra Section III.D. 
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and Trademark Office (USPTO) and its counterparts worldwide, and 
no patent office can “fix” patent quality alone.  Indeed, given the 
number of annual filings, it is hard to imagine any scenario in which 
enough resources could be directed toward this effort to have a mean-
ingful impact.  Instead, a serious effort to improve patent quality will 
need to address the reasons why patentees increasingly adopt a high-
volume, low-quality patenting strategy, why litigation has become vir-
tually the only reliable tool for determining a patent’s scope and valid-
ity, and why memes such as “patent trolls” and “patent thickets” have 
become embedded in current legal-policy discourse. 
A patent system that yields high-quality patents is an attainable goal.  
But administrative reforms—although they might well help—will not 
alone get us there.  Until patentees have strong, unequivocal incentives 
to seek patents that clearly meet the standards of patentability, that are 
explained in the context of the prior art, and that draw clear and un-
ambiguous lines around their subject matter, we will not succeed.  The 
tools are there—we just need to understand which ones to use. 
I. PATENT QUALITY: A READER’S GUIDE
A.  What Is Patent Quality? 
At the outset, it is important to be precise about what I mean by 
“patent quality” in this context.  Patent quality is the capacity of a 
granted patent to meet (or exceed) the statutory standards of pat-
entability—most importantly, to be novel, nonobvious, and clearly and 
sufficiently described.9  Thus, a “low quality” patent is one granted for 
an invention that does not meet these standards.  And, although it 
should be clear, I want to make plain that there is a definite distinc-
tion between the quality of a patent (as I use the term here), and its 
value.  Although there may at times be a relationship between value 
and quality in patenting—in an ideal world, the correlation would be 
rather strong—at other times these characteristics will be independ-
ent.  A patent’s value depends on factors well beyond those of concern 
to the patent law—the size of the relevant market, the relationship be-
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (requirement of novelty); id. § 103 (requirement of 
nonobviousness); id. § 112 (requirement of specification).  While other provisions of 
the U.S. Code might also be described as standards of validity, including the subject 
matter and utility requirements, id. § 101, and the inventorship requirement, id. § 116, 
the novelty, nonobviousness, and specification requirements are overwhelmingly the 
most important. 
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tween the patent’s scope and a marketable good or service, and many 
others.  Some of these factors will suggest the quality of the patent, 
such as the nature of the advance over the prior art, but others have 
little or nothing to do with patent quality as defined above. 
B.  Should We Care About Patent Quality? 
Another threshold question is whether there is a problem with 
patent quality worthy of further consideration.  That is, an argument 
might be put forth that although higher patent quality is better than 
lower patent quality, there is no particular reason to believe that the 
current state of affairs is dramatically suboptimal.  A stronger form of 
this argument would posit a tradeoff between patent quality and costs, 
and suggest that perhaps “high” patent quality is an inefficient goal:  it 
is better, perhaps, to allow market forces (in the form of litigation and 
licensing) to sort the wheat from the chaff in terms of quality in the 
same way that patent value is cleared.10
I have significant sympathy for this line of argument.  Reaching a 
state of affairs where every granted patent meets or exceeds the stan-
dards of patentability seems both implausible and likely a misalloca-
tion of resources.  The patent-prosecution process is fraught with seri-
ous information problems of the sort that a robust marketplace might 
be able to resolve at least as well as an over-taxed administrative 
agency.11  However, the case for better patent quality still carries the 
day, for the several reasons that follow. 
10 F. Scott Kieff and Mark Lemley have both made versions of this argument.  Kieff 
suggests that much patent-quality assessment is best left to the marketplace, while Lem-
ley makes the less vigorous argument that it is likely rational to be relatively uncertain 
about patent quality (“rationally ignorant”) at the USPTO, as so few patents have any 
substantial value in the marketplace.  See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 2, at 67-69 
(describing with approval the “commercialization” model of patents, in which the 
“screening role” is played by the “competitors of the patentee”); Mark A. Lemley, Essay, 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1531 (2001) (concluding 
that determinations of patent quality “can be made much more efficiently in litigation, 
because only a tiny percentage of patents are ever litigated or even licensed to others”). 
11 I, as well as many others, have observed the information problems inherent in 
patent prosecution.  See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 181-
84 (2006) (explaining patent prosecution procedures and noting that “the informa-
tion costs incurred by the Patent Office are quite high”); Michael Risch, The Failure of 
Public Notice in Patent Prosecution, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 209-10 (2007) (noting the 
information problems of patent prosecutions resulting from “a lack of clarity in patent 
claims”); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System:  A Proposal 
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 312-17 (explaining how the “overload” of 
information necessary to patent examiners may negatively impact “Patent Office work 
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1.  Uncertainty 
Particularly compelling is the recognition that a patent system 
characterized by low patent quality sows substantial uncertainty at all 
levels of the patent system:  uncertainty about the validity of granted 
patents, uncertainty about the scope of granted patents, uncertainty 
about whether a particular invention is patentable, and uncertainty 
about whether a valid patent will be fully enforced. 
Uncertainty obviously makes business decisions based on patents 
(whether by patentees, prospective licensees, investors, etc.) much 
more difficult and costly.  To be sure, I recognize that uncertainty ex-
ists in virtually every human activity, and that robust markets can func-
tion well despite that uncertainty.  But it is important to remember 
that patent laws are an intervention into the free operation of the 
market—a well-justified intervention, in my view, but an intervention 
nonetheless.12  Accordingly, the basis of the patent system is that the 
propertization of certain ideas (“patentable” ones, of course) will 
stimulate behaviors that will enable the market to better support in-
novation.13  The strongest case for the patent system, then, is where it 
product”); R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel:  Patent Administration and the Failure of
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 169-77 (2002) (discussing the “significant informational 
costs of patent prosecution”). 
12 Although it is well beyond the scope of this Article to explore the underlying 
policy basis for the patent system, the highlight is that innovation has characteristics of 
a public good (i.e., the cost of providing the good does not increase with consumption, 
and it is generally infeasible to exclude others from consuming the good), and is likely 
to be underproduced in the absence of market intervention.  The classic articulation 
of this idea is found in Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SO-
CIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).  For an overview 
of public-good economics, see HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS ch. 23 (3d 
ed. 1992).  For my views, see generally R. Polk Wagner, Essay, Information Wants to Be 
Free:  Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003) 
(arguing that the quantity of “open” information in the public domain is likely to in-
crease where information goods are more propertized).  For further information, see 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW 18-20 (2003) (describing the “public-good character of intellec-
tual property”); Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1476-78 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell eds., 2007) (explaining how the economic interest in intellectual property has 
grown “out of the critical importance of innovation to social welfare”). 
13 It is important to remember that the patent system does not merely introduce 
incentives to create inventions, but also to commercialize inventions and invest in in-
ventive activity—that is, to create, more broadly, a market for innovative activity.  See, e.g.,
F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 697, 710 (2001) (“The patent right to exclude competitors . . . provides incentives 
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best performs the function of enabling the market for innovation.  
And it cannot do so particularly well when the basic component of the 
implementation mechanism—property rights in (patentable) ideas—
are so imbued with uncertainty.14  Again, uncertainty is both unavoid-
able and unlikely to be crushing (at least at moderate levels) in this 
context.  But I am convinced that the current patent system has too 
much uncertainty, and that low patent quality bears substantial re-
sponsibility for it.  It is the patent reformer’s version of the Hippo-
cratic Oath:  first, consider uncertainty. 
2.  Type I and Type II Errors15
By definition, a low-quality patent system is characterized by a 
large number of errors in the patent-granting process.  Paradigmati-
cally, we think of these errors as being inappropriate grants—that is, 
patents granted that do not meet the standards of patentability.  But 
errors in the patent-granting process also involve inappropriate deni-
als—those where patentable inventions are turned away.  These errors 
may well be as costly to society as inappropriate grants, for they may 
undermine the incentives for important innovations to be fully com-
mercialized or have demoralizing effects on future research efforts.16
3.  The Cure Is Worse than the Disease 
Another reason to be concerned about patent quality is that many 
of the current responses to low-quality patents may have unintended 
pernicious effects across the patent system.  For example, in eBay Inc. 
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court’s widely reported rejection 
of the Federal Circuit’s longstanding presumption in favor of injunc-
tive relief for patent infringement was largely based on four Justices’ 
for the holder of the invention and the other players in this market to come together and 
incur all costs necessary to facilitate commercialization of the patented invention.”); 
Wagner, supra note 11, at 193 n.105 (collecting sources describing “the number of activi-
ties that are stimulated by the existence of the patent system”). 
14 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1729, 
1754-64 (2004) (discussing uncertainty in property rules). 
15 In statistics, “type I” errors are false positives, while “type II” errors are false 
negatives. See GRAHAM UPTON & IAN COOK, A DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS 200-01 (2d 
ed. 2006) (discussing type I and type II errors in the “hypothesis test” entry).  In the 
context of this Article, a type I error would be the inappropriate grant of a patent that 
did not fully achieve the standards of patentability, and a type II error would be the 
inappropriate denial of a patentable application. 
16 These errors are also, of course, far less visible by their very nature. 
2142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 2135
sense that patent quality was too low to support permanent injunctive 
relief in many cases.17  The rule change, of course, at least marginally 
reduces the power of patents, and increases uncertainty surrounding 
the enforcement of both high-quality and low-quality patents.  Like-
wise, the various reform efforts to curtail the activities of so-called 
“patent trolls” have produced similarly undesirable results.  Many of 
these measures, such as limiting the damages available to infringed 
patentees, would also diminish patent power while increasing uncer-
tainty regarding enforcement, again irrespective of patent quality.18
4.  Litigation and Strategic Behavior 
Perhaps the most obvious consequence of low patent quality is the 
increase in litigation observed over the past decade or so—both in 
terms of raw filings and “litigation intensity,” gauged by the number of 
suits filed per in-force patent.  Figure 1 below shows this trend.
17 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842-43 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the “potential 
vagueness and suspect validity” of many patents obtained by patent trolls).  For subse-
quent developments, see Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercEx-
change, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006):  A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, 89 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 631, 633 (2007) (positing greater uncertainty, but finding rela-
tively little change in courts’ subsequent granting or denial of injunctions); Jeremy 
Mulder, Note, The Aftermath of eBay:  Predicting When District Courts Will Grant Permanent 
Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 72 (2007) (noting that, because 
eBay’s equitable-standards approach provided little practical guidance to district courts, 
and because district court determinations are only reviewable for abuse of discretion, 
“district courts will shape the future of patent injunction case law”). 
18 See John Markoff, Two Views of Innovation, Colliding in Washington, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2008, § 3, at 3 (noting disagreement over the effect that legislation intended to 
combat “patent trolls” will have on innovation and prices). 
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Figure 1:  Patent Litigation Intensity, 1988–2005 
Figure 1:  Patent Litigation Intensity, 1988–2005 
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Note:  This chart represents the number of patent-infringement 
suits filed per 1000 in-force patents between the years 1988 and 
2005.19
A low-quality patent system means that there are more patents 
with greater uncertainty, leading to increasing disputes over patents 
and increasing appeal to the decision maker of last resort—the court 
system.  Further, a greater number of uncertain patents means that 
litigation becomes more complex and expensive, adding to both the 
private and social costs of the system as a whole.  What might be some-
19 Lawsuit information is provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
(AO) in its Annual Reports.  Patent-filing data are provided by the USPTO Annual Re-
ports.  Calculation of in-force patents is conducted by reducing the total potential 
number of in-force patents (using expiration-date data) by the proportion of patents 
that expire early due to failure to pay maintenance fees. For AO data, see Judicial 
Business of the United States Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/ 
judbus.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).  For USPTO data, see USPTO Annual Reports, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2009).  Patent-renewal-rate data are also reported and compiled in Gideon Parcho-
movsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15 tbl.1 (2005). 
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what less apparent is that a low-quality patent system enables greater 
opportunities for socially harmful strategic behavior:  with more pat-
ents and more uncertainty (both in terms of the patents themselves, as 
well as the possible scope of enforcement), the system can be ex-
ploited—whether by filing low-probability, high-cost suits or by seeking 
large numbers of low-quality patents to use as leverage for settlement. 
Litigation is a necessary, important, and unavoidable part of the 
private enforcement scheme that is fundamental to the patent system, 
and strategic behavior exists in every form of human economic activ-
ity.  Even a patent system with only the highest, most valid, and most 
clear patents will have both litigation and strategic behavior.  But it is 
also clear that low-quality patents will create more of the costs associ-
ated with such litigation. 
5.  The Public Believes that There Is a Patent Problem 
Although most academics likely believe that patent quality could 
(and should) be higher, it seems very clear that even those less famil-
iar with the patent system are convinced that there is a serious prob-
lem.  In part, this reflects the mass media’s treatment of the patent 
system in recent decades:  articles and editorials headlined “Patently 
Absurd” (and variations thereof) are all-too-common features of the 
popular press’s coverage.20  Several Supreme Court Justices likewise 
seem to see a serious problem with patent quality (apparently they 
read the New York Times as well).21  Certain industries, notably the 
high-tech industry, have been engaged in a concerted public relations 
effort that, among other things, highlights patent quality problems.22
And as the patent system grows in importance—by both increasing in 
size and in visibility to the modern knowledge economy—the impor-
tance of this public perception will increase.  It determines the future 
direction of the system and the role it will play in innovation policy. 
20 E.g., James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 44; Edito-
rial, Patently Absurd, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2006, at A14; Editorial, Patently Flawed, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 23, 2007, at A10; Patently Obvious, ECONOMIST, May 5, 2007, at 78; Edito-
rial, Patently Obvious, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2007, at A16; Editorial, Patently Ridiculous, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A24. 
21 See, e.g., eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An industry has de-
veloped in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”). 
22 See Pear, supra note 1 (reporting that brand-name drug companies lobbied 
Congress for a patent bill that would make it harder for the generic drug companies to 
assert claims of inequitable conduct on the part of brand-name patent holders). 
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6.  Feedback Effects 
Finally, and most importantly, a low-quality patent system is likely 
to be self-reinforcing.  If low-quality patents create uncertainty, spur 
increased litigation, and provide opportunities for strategic behavior, 
one important response will be for firms to file more low-quality pat-
ents.  While I consider this issue in more detail in Part II below, the 
basic outline is that a firm’s rational response to a patent system with 
large numbers of low-quality patents is to seek more patents, irrespec-
tive of their individual quality.23  As Professor Parchomovsky and I 
have argued, this phenomenon nicely explains some important recent 
trends in patenting behavior, especially the increase in filings and 
patent intensity.24  It may well be that the feedback effects from low-
quality patents have created a spiral-down effect, meaning that, with-
out intervention, we should expect patent quality to worsen over time. 
But it might well be that the converse is also true.  A patent system 
with higher-quality patents seems likely to be more certain and less 
prone to strategic manipulation, thereby encouraging patentees to 
seek fewer, better, and clearer patents than they would under a low-
quality system. 
*      *      * 
To return to the question noted above, is there a serious patent-
quality problem?  The short answer, as with so many issues in patent 
law, is that we do not know for sure.  But, as I have outlined above, 
even those skeptical about the seriousness of the problem should 
nonetheless care about patent quality. 
II. PATENT-QUALITY MECHANISMS: WHAT 
CAUSES LOW PATENT QUALITY?
Why are so many patents of low quality?  That is, why does the 
USPTO grant a substantial numbers of patents every year that do not 
meet the required standards of patentability?  This is not merely a rhe-
torical question:  the core mission of patent offices worldwide is to 
23 See infra Section II.C. 
24 See generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 19 (presenting a patent-
portfolio theory, which argues that it is in a firm’s best interest to obtain an aggrega-
tion of related patents regardless of their individual worth, as an explanation of the 
recent increase in patent filings and intensity). 
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evaluate applications against the standards of patentability, and it is 
not self-evident that an invalid patent is in the interest of the holder.25
Furthermore, as has been noted above, low-quality patents are costly 
to society at large and are vilified in the popular press and academic 
circles alike.  Why, then, are there so many of them? 
The easy answer is that evaluating inventions in light of the statu-
tory standards of patentability is a difficult and uncertain business, 
fraught with serious information problems and with shifting legal tests 
and frameworks, and it must take place against a backdrop of limited 
resources.26  This is all certainly true; even under the best of circum-
stances, one would expect a nontrivial number of invalid patents to 
slip through the system and a number of patentable inventions to be 
inappropriately rejected.  Yet this answer, I think, is incomplete.  It ac-
counts for neither the pervasive sense of most observers of the patent 
system that patent quality is poor and worsening, nor the various met-
rics that appear to signal growing concern.27  If patentees, the USPTO, 
and the public are all put in a worse position by low-quality patents, 
why does patent quality not improve?
Understanding this puzzle—that is, why patent quality is low de-
spite the near-universal agreement that low quality is suboptimal and 
despite the focus on quality by the administrative agencies—is the first 
step to any serious effort to address the issue.  A careful analysis re-
veals that low patent quality is supported by a series of powerful incen-
tives:  (1) incentives that encourage patentees to draft patent applica-
tions that effectively obscure the true scope of the invention and its 
relationship to the prior art; (2) incentives that lead the administra-
tive agencies (the USPTO and other patent offices) to conduct rela-
tively ineffective examinations of many patents; and, most impor-
tantly, (3) incentives that compel modern innovative firms to adopt a 
high-volume, low-quality patenting strategy.  I discuss these three sets 
of incentives (as well as others) in more detail below.  A consideration 
of these incentives suggests that patent quality is not a question of bu-
reaucratic incompetence or administrative process, but instead a prob-
lem of interlocking incentive structures that impose themselves on the 
entire patent system. 
25 Even were we to set aside the substantial resources involved in obtaining patents 
for argument’s sake, invalid patents are still not cost-effective because they will bar 
their holders from later patents on the same or similar inventions. 
26 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (citing sources arguing that patent 
prosecution is rife with informational problems). 
27 See supra Section I.B (discussing the reasons for such concern). 
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A.  Deferring Clarity 
I start with the unremarkable premise that a patentee has a strong 
incentive to draft, file, and prosecute a valid patent with claims that 
cover appropriate subject matter.  Applications rejected by the Patent 
Office, and those found invalid by courts during litigation, are ulti-
mately worthless and often leave the patentee in a far worse position, 
given the capital expenditures,28 opportunity costs,29 and preclusive 
effects30 incurred by the process.  Yet this tenet is too simple for a few 
reasons.  First, it overlooks the dual-stage nature of patent-validity 
analysis, wherein a first evaluation is conducted by the Patent Office 
and a second during any enforcement action that may occur.31  These 
stages have critical differences.  By necessity, the first stage of this 
analysis involves a softer look:  resources are limited, patent examiners 
are likely underinformed, and so forth.32  Further, without a particular 
“targeted” good or service in hand, a careful analysis of the scope of 
the patent (i.e., the subject matter encompassed within the claims) is 
understandably unlikely.33  During the litigation stage of the analysis, 
28 According to surveys by the American Intellectual Property Law Association, it 
costs upwards of $10,000 to prosecute a patent application of even moderate complex-
ity, and it can cost much more if extensive amendments are required.  AM. INTELLEC-
TUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 21 (2007). 
29 The opportunity costs of an invalid patent involve those resources which could 
have been dedicated to a valid patent and the missed opportunity to adequately pro-
tect a patentable invention. 
30 These generally preclude the patentee from seeking a patent on ideas—even 
her own—disclosed more than a year prior to application.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(2006) (considering an invention to have been disclosed if it was either “patented or 
described in a printed publication,” whether in the United States or abroad). 
31 That those accused of patent infringement may seek to have the patent invali-
dated is an important (and unique) aspect of the patent law.  See id. § 282 (listing various 
defenses to patent infringement, including “invalidity of the patent”). 
32 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 11, at 314 (noting how patent examiners “are al-
lowed only a limited time to sift through enormous amounts” of information, and ex-
plaining the limitations inherent in their “information-gathering techniques”). 
33 Indeed, one problem with the current patent-examination process is that the 
USPTO does not explicitly determine the meaning of claim language but rather uses 
what it describes as “the broadest reasonable construction” analysis. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2111 (8th ed., 7th rev. 2008) [hereinafter USPTO, MPEP] (“During patent examina-
tion, the pending claims must be ‘given their broadest reasonable interpretation con-
sistent with the specification.’”).  The Federal Circuit has acknowledged (and appar-
ently blessed) this approach: 
The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) determines the scope of claims in 
patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giv-
ing claims their broadest reasonable construction “in light of the specification 
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patents are given a much closer look by virtue of the adversarial litiga-
tion process and the need to analyze the scope of the patent against a 
particularized target (the accused infringing good).  Of course, this 
harder look comes at a substantial cost, both to the patentee and to 
the challenger or accused infringer.  Accordingly, the grant (i.e., the 
completion of the first stage of analysis) will attach a market value to the 
patent—irrespective of the patent’s validity—that relates to the cost of 
obtaining a decision on validity from the courts.  Thus, even clearly in-
valid patents, once granted, have some recognized value to patentees.34
It is also important to recognize the critical component of timing 
in any analysis of patent incentives.  Patent prosecution can take years, 
and most enforced patents are still subject to suit several years after 
they are issued.35  This means that a patent applicant must necessarily 
be a futurist:  she must look down the road of technological advance-
ment, perhaps a decade or more, to predict the market for the tech-
nology and the behavior of competitors, among other things.  A pat-
ent application written in year zero might be enforceable only in year 
three (due to the pendency of prosecution), and the market might 
not be significant until year five.  By then, competitors will have the 
benefit of intervening technological advancements and the teachings 
of the patent itself.  In order for the patent to retain power (and thus 
value for the patentee) in the marketplace, it will have to be written in 
anticipation of these changes and be a substantial advance over the 
prior art alternatives. 
I want to be clear that the set of circumstances above is precisely as 
designed, and almost certainly socially beneficial:  that very few pat-
as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.”  Indeed, the 
rules of the PTO require that application claims must “conform to the inven-
tion as set forth in the remainder of the specification and the terms and 
phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in the 
description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertain-
able by reference to the description.”  
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citation 
omitted). 
34 However, that value may be (and I think is likely to be) less than the sum of the 
sunk costs, opportunity costs, and costs of preclusion.  See supra notes 28-30 (explaining 
these costs). 
35 See Scott Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary:  Uniformity, 
Forum Shopping and the Federal Circuit 39 tbl.4 (May 2008) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1129846 (finding that, since the estab-
lishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the average age of a litigated 
patent is almost six-and-a-half years). 
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ents have real marketplace value36 is, in my view, a tremendous benefit 
of the system to society.37  But the fact that the deck is, in some ways, 
stacked against the patentee does create powerful incentives, and pat-
entees will (and do) respond.  Most obviously, of course, patent law-
yers are trained with precisely this scenario in mind—I have always re-
garded teaching claim drafting as a short course in prognostication.38
But the timing-based incentives also create strong interests in defer-
ring a careful analysis of the patent (especially with regard to claim 
scope) for as long as possible, or at least retaining as broad a range of 
possibilities for as long as one can.  Given that the patentee is solely in 
control of the words used to describe and claim the invention, a ra-
tional patentee will tailor the language accordingly.  This strategy 
manifests itself in two ways.  First, a patentee will almost certainly seek 
substantial vagueness, thus gaining flexibility to effectively alter the 
scope and description of the patent according to changing circum-
stances.  Second, because of legal rules which penalize detailed de-
scriptions, the less description the patentee can provide the better she 
will be.39  Both of these strategies—creating vagueness and providing a 
lack of description—have important costs to the patent system.  At 
best, they make it much harder to evaluate the scope and validity of a 
patent, and make it much more likely that mistakes will be made.  In 
many cases, they allow patentees to exploit the dual-stage-analysis 
process noted above to obtain a patent under one understanding of 
the language (e.g., a narrow understanding) and later assert that same 
patent in a way that broadens the scope of coverage.  And, in all cases, 
36 For a discussion of how many patents are actually “valuable,” see Mark A. Lem-
ley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 80-83 (2005), and Par-
chomovsky & Wagner, supra note 19, at 16-19. 
37 Patents are privately enforced (i.e., they act as a “hunting license,” not as a re-
ward), and therefore society only “pays” a patentee when her patent has market value.  
The remaining patented inventions are disclosed to the public for free (and eventu-
ally, of course, enter the public domain).  See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 36, at 84 
(noting that patents are “neither litigated nor licensed for a royalty” in ninety-five per-
cent of cases).  For a more general theory of how incomplete capture is a key tenet of 
intellectual property laws, see Wagner, supra note 12. 
38 For the classic treatment of claim drafting (one which nearly all patent lawyers 
experience at some time), see generally ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF 
PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING (5th ed. 2006). 
39 For example, the Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., re-
garding claim-construction methodologies, makes clear that the description in a pat-
ent’s specification will be used to alter claim scope.  415 F.3d 1303, 1315-17 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (en banc).  See generally Wagner, supra note 11, at 214-16 (explaining the strate-
gic gains of making “broad claims” and “vaguely” describing an invention). 
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they yield patents that are substantially less likely to comport with the 
statutory standards of validity—that is, low-quality patents. 
It is important to note that although there are patent rules that 
discourage the deferral of clarity, there are also several rules that sup-
port it.  First, although 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires clear and adequate 
disclosure as well as clear and distinct claim language,40 the USPTO 
rejects fewer patent applications for § 112 disclosure problems than 
for prior art problems and virtually never provides a detailed analysis 
of claim language, meaning that serious § 112 analysis is left for litiga-
tion.41  Second, the statutory presumption of validity42 encourages pat-
entees to pursue a flexible view of their patent:  narrow during prose-
cution, when the risk of rejection because of prior art is higher, and 
broader during litigation, when patent scope is of paramount impor-
tance.  Third, the Federal Circuit’s rules regarding claim construc-
tion—that claims are to be understood in a contextual, holistic man-
ner, without any established process or framework—encourage 
patentees to limit the disclosure of their invention (as such disclosure 
can be used to create “context” for fixing claim scope), and ensure 
that the final analysis of claim scope (and thus virtually all other valid-
40 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) states the following: 
 The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of 
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, 
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall 
set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his in-
vention. 
 The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly point-
ing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards 
as his invention.  
41 Indeed, the USPTO itself notes in the USPTO, MPEP that “[b]y far the most 
frequent ground of rejection is on the ground of unpatentability in view of the prior 
art, that is, that the claimed subject matter is either not novel under 35 U.S.C. 102, or 
else it is obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103.”  MPEP, supra note 33, § 706.02. 
42 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) states the following: 
A patent shall be presumed valid.  Each claim of a patent (whether in inde-
pendent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple depend-
ent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid 
claim . . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim 
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.  
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ity and enforcement matters) will only occur after appeal to the Fed-
eral Circuit.43
Deferring clarity then offers a number of critical advantages to the 
patentee.  It allows the patentee to capture some value for an inven-
tion at a very early stage simply by receiving a grant.  And it hedges 
against the patent being undermined by the passage of time and 
technology, allowing patents to change their scope to fit later circum-
stances.  Further, while some legal rules oppose this strategy—most 
importantly, perhaps, § 112—others support it.44  Therefore, it should 
be no surprise that many rational patentees would seek to defer clar-
ity, and that such an action plays an important role in diminishing the 
quality of patents. 
B.  Administrative Incentives 
In addition to patentees’ incentives to defer clarity, there are 
powerful incentives on the part of the USPTO that have the effect of 
reducing patent quality.  Most of these are straightforward and under-
standable.  The first set of administrative incentives encourages the 
Patent Office to issue many patents.  Resources are limited, and filings 
continue to rise rapidly.  Pendency—the number of patent applications 
in the prosecution process—has risen strikingly in the last few years. 
43 See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313 (“[T]he person of ordinary skill in the art is 
deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which 
the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the speci-
fication.”); see also R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything?  
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence 27-33 
(Apr. 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (criticizing the Federal 
Circuit’s opinion in Phillips for choosing a holistic—as opposed to procedural—
approach to claim construction). 
44 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining how legal rules tend to 
incentivize a lack of clarity in patent description). 
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Figure 2:  Patent Activity in the United States, 1986–200745
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This leads to a strong push for higher throughput (i.e., more 
processed patents).  There are two ways, of course, to raise through-
put:  deny more patent applications more quickly, and grant more 
patents more quickly.  And while it appears that the USPTO has mark-
edly lowered the allowance rate in the past couple of years, as seen in 
Figure 3, it is clear that the number of patents issued has risen as well.
45 These data are compiled from the USPTO Performance and Accountability Re-
ports.  To view these reports, see USPTO Annual Reports, supra note 19. 
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Figure 3:  Allowance Rate for U.S. Patent Applications, 1997–200846
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Second, there are inherent institutional biases that may serve to 
favor weaker, lower-value patents.  Patent law is a specialized field, 
with many repeat players; in this context, there are always concerns 
that the views of the insiders (here, large patentees) will carry more 
weight than those of the public at large.  Although this does not neces-
sarily mean that the institutional biases will favor lower quality patents, 
if the insiders’ interests tend toward lower quality patents then the insti-
tutions may well reflect those views.  Further, even beyond the inherent 
institutional biases, there are other internal, bureaucratic incentives at 
the USPTO in favor of granting patents, as a component of an exam-
iner’s performance evaluation depends on “production counts,” which 
are most easily and quickly obtained by allowing patent applications.47
46 These data are compiled from the European Patent Office Trilateral Statistic 
Reports.  To view these reports, see Trilateral Statistical Reports, http://www. 
trilateral.net/statistics/tsr.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
47 An examiner receives a “count” towards his productivity for an “allowance or a 
non-final rejection.”  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FINAL 
INSPECTION REPORT NO. IPE-15722, USPTO SHOULD REASSESS HOW EXAMINER GOALS,
PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLANS, AND THE AWARD SYSTEM STIMULATE AND REWARD EX-
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C.  Feedback Effects:  The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Patent Quality 
Perhaps one of the thorniest incentive mechanisms to unravel in 
this context is the fact that one important mechanism favoring lower-
quality patents is the large quantity of existing low-quality patents.  
That is, a patentee has incentives to seek low-quality patents at least in 
part because of what might be best described as the “feedback effect” 
of low patent quality.  This phenomenon is related to what Professor 
Parchomovsky describes as the “patent paradox”:  if virtually all pat-
ents have negative cash value (i.e., their acquisition cost is greater 
than their expected value), then why do so many otherwise quite ra-
tional firms file for so many patents and in fact increase their patent 
intensity over time?48  Although there are several possible reasons for 
this, Parchomovsky and I think the simplest explanation is that ra-
tional patentees adopt a high-volume, low-quality patenting strategy 
because it maximizes the possibility of gaining an advantage from the 
current patent system.49  In our earlier work, we sketch a range of im-
portant reasons why a high-volume, low-quality strategy—what we call 
a portfolio strategy—is advantageous in the modern innovation econ-
omy.50  Having many patents, even if their quality is low, can provide 
much-needed marketplace power in a world where individual patents 
become increasingly less certain in scope and validity.51  More specifi-
cally, having many patents, even if they are of low quality, can hedge 
against the difficulties in predicting the future noted above; by casting 
a broader net, with many patents in a particular field, less emphasis is 
placed on the need for any individual patent to endure into the fu-
ture.52  Also, having many patents, even if they are of low quality, can 
AMINER PRODUCTION 7-8 (2004), available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/oig/ 
reports/2004/USPTO-IPE-15722-09-04.pdf.  Because an examiner will presumably take 
more time before rejecting an application and exposing herself to the appeals process, 
the easiest way to ensure “productivity” is to quickly accept patent applications. 
48 See generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 19, at 16-19 (describing the 
“patent paradox” through an analysis of the falling value of patents and the increase in 
the volume of filings). 
49 See id. at 27-43 (presenting a theory of patent portfolios that argues that the benefits 
of a high-volume patent strategy “are substantial enough to encourage patenting behavior 
irrespective of the expected value of the underlying individual patents themselves”). 
50 Id.
51 See id. at 32-37 (describing how a portfolio of related patents acts as a “super-patent,” 
which “allow[s] the holder to exclude others from the collective scope of its claims”). 
52 See id. at 37-41 (“[D]iversity—the fact that no single patent determines the 
value—is a major benefit of patent portfolios.  By distributing the importance of the 
total portfolio across the constituent individual patents, a patent portfolio allows hold-
ers to significantly hedge against aspects of risk and uncertainty . . . .”). 
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hedge against changes in the law itself.53  This is not to suggest that a 
patent-portfolio approach inevitably leads to low quality—indeed, 
high volume, high quality would clearly be better.  But, given resource 
constraints, the point is that the major participants in the modern 
patent system appear to have chosen a strategy that privileges volume 
of patents over quality. 
Further, as we suggest in Patent Portfolios, the fact that others in the 
patent system are adopting a portfolio strategy is likely to further en-
courage the high-volume, low-quality approach.  If the “coin of the 
realm” in the innovation economy is an ever-increasing patent portfo-
lio, then firms will increase their patent portfolios (again, at the ex-
pense of quality).54  Thus, there exists a feedback effect, whereby low-
quality patents (organized into ever-larger portfolios) beget even 
more low-quality patents.  In this way, low patent quality might resem-
ble a prisoner’s dilemma:  even if most firms would be better off with 
high-quality patents (and fewer of them), adopting such a strategy in 
the face of others’ more numerous (and lower quality) patents is dis-
advantageous.  Thus firms maintain the suboptimal strategy, unable to 
successfully increase patent quality without widespread agreement 
among peers. 
D.  Cognitive Biases and Patent Quality 
One additional mechanism that may support lower patent quality 
comes in the form of cognitive biases on the part of patentees—biases 
that encourage patentees to seek more patents than necessary, but to 
expend fewer resources on each patent.  Consider that the distribu-
tion of patent value is very highly skewed, with a very small number of 
patents being very valuable and virtually all others having little or even 
negative value.  A patentee deciding whether to seek patents will, like 
any decision maker, be subject to cognitive biases of various sorts.  
Most importantly for our purposes is the prospect theory, which holds 
that decision makers will tend to overweight low-probability events 
and invest resources even where rational assessment of the probability 
would suggest otherwise (this theory is used to explain, among other 
53 See id. at 39-41 (explaining how “the diversity-features of patent portfolios” spe-
cifically address “uncertainty related to the patent law itself”). 
54 See id. at 60 (predicting that “innovation-driven firms will increasingly view pat-
ent portfolios as essential to their long-term success and behave accordingly”). 
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things, the success of lotteries).55  In the patent context, the prospect 
theory would suggest why too many patents are filed:  patentees 
oveweight the likelihood that a patent will in fact have significant 
value.  At first blush, this might also suggest that patentees would over-
invest in patent quality, because an invalid patent is virtually certain to 
have no value.56  But research into cognitive biases suggests that deci-
sion makers alter their assessments of probabilities based on the fram-
ing of the decision, and that people tend to make decisions that avoid 
even small chances of loss.  If patenting decisions are made in stages—
first an essentially binary decision to seek a patent or not, and later (or 
even ongoing) decisions about resources to invest into the patent-
prosecution process—then it is probable that decision makers would 
simultaneously decide to patent too much, while underinvesting in 
each patent.  That is, once a decision is made to seek a patent on a 
particular invention, assume that a decision maker has to decide 
whether to spend $10,000 or $50,000 on acquisition costs.  Because 
the decision to patent has already been made, the acquisition cost is 
likely framed as a loss, and loss aversion would suggest that the 
cheaper, lower-quality route would be taken.  Note that, given the ini-
tial bias leading to overpatenting, the choice to under-invest in the 
patent might well be fully rational—there is an exceedingly small 
chance of the patent possessing positive value, after all.  But even if 
this second decision is rational for the patentee, the two-stage decision 
process—to patent, but underinvest in quality—will obviously lead to 
lower-quality patenting behavior. 
Understanding the patenting choice as a series of two decisions 
(to patent, then invest) suggests that other forms of cognitive bias 
might support low-quality patents.  For example, prospective patent-
ees might be overconfident about the expected value of their inven-
tion, leading to a positive patenting decision, followed later by the 
analysis about resource expenditures noted above.  In this way, cogni-
tive biases can support low-quality-patenting behavior. 
55 For a comparison of how the patent system is like “a lottery where players have a 
low probability of winning a large jackpot,” see Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery:  
Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 142, 
149-59 (2008). 
56 This is subject to the exception noted above—there is some value in any 
granted patent, due to the cost that others will incur to have it declared invalid.  See
supra text accompanying note 34.  But, in this context, this exception will have little 
impact, as it is certain that an invalid patent will not have a very large return. 
2009] Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms 2157
E.  Nontraditional Uses of Patents 
It is now common to note that patents are obtained for reasons 
other than what is often assumed by classical theory.  That is, the tra-
ditional understanding is that a patentee obtains a patent to protect 
an investment in knowledge by utilizing the patent’s right to exclude 
others from the scope of a good or service that is based on the pat-
ented idea.  We now understand that patentees often patent for many 
reasons in addition to (or instead of) the classic explanation.  And, in 
each of these cases, if the long-term enforceability of the patent is 
relatively less important, then the importance of patent quality is re-
duced as well.  For example, if a patentee is patenting primarily (or 
even partly) for defensive purposes—so as to have an arsenal of possi-
ble patents to use in counterclaims in any lawsuits, or as a means to 
preclude competitors from obtaining relevant patents—then that pat-
entee will care less about patent quality; what matters to the patentee 
in such a case is not the ability to withstand a validity challenge in liti-
gation, but simply the ownership of the patent.57  The bare minimum 
required to squeak through the Patent Office is sufficient.  Similarly, 
Professor Long’s suggestion that patentees use patents as signals of 
innovative acumen or technological savvy should likewise lead to 
lower-quality patents:  if patents are used as external signals inde-
pendent of themselves, their quality is relatively unimportant.58  As 
more patentees adopt these nontraditional approaches, we can expect 
patent quality to drop. 
The core incentive mechanisms identified above—deferring clar-
ity, administrative incentives, feedback effects, cognitive biases, and 
nontraditional uses for patents—are likely not the only incentive 
mechanisms supporting low-quality patents in the modern patent sys-
tem.  And, as I noted above, there are certainly plenty of incentives 
57 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revis-
ited:  An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 
RAND J. ECON. 101, 125 (2001) (describing how stronger patent rights correlate with 
the defensive tactic of using patents as “bargaining chips,” which can lead to “patent 
portfolio races”); Lemley, supra note 10, at 1504 (noting that the defensive strategy re-
lies on sheer volume of patents, and not necessarily on patent quality); Wesley M. 
Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:  Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 7552, 2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (finding that eighty-
two percent of respondents to a survey listed “blocking rival patents on related innova-
tions” as a motive for patenting). 
58 See, e.g., Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 655-58 (2002) (con-
sidering patents as a means of credibly publicizing information). 
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(and rules) supporting high-quality patents.  The point here is that 
there are several powerful (and, in many cases, growing) incentives in 
favor of low-quality-patenting behavior.  We should therefore not be 
surprised that most observers believe that patent quality is a serious 
and growing problem:  we are merely seeing the harvest of what has 
been sown (intentionally or unintentionally) by the incentive struc-
tures in the modern patent system. 
III. THE DURABILITY OF LOW PATENT QUALITY:
WHY MOST REFORMS WILL FAIL
If the preceding outline of the several significant incentive struc-
tures that support low-quality-patenting behavior demonstrates any-
thing, it is that low patent quality is not a simple matter of reform-
ing—even quite radically—the Patent Office.  Instead, low patent 
quality is a problem with roots deeply embedded in the incentive 
structure of the current patent system, and, is in fact aligned with ma-
jor long-term trends such as the rise in patenting activity and the 
changing use of patents in the marketplace.  Yet most of the efforts 
and proposals that have emerged to date treat patent quality as mainly 
an administrative issue, to be adjusted primarily through the altera-
tion of the patent-prosecution process.  In this Part, I briefly sketch 
some of the major reform efforts—both undertaken and proposed—
and note whether they are likely to overcome (or at least address) the 
incentives that create low-quality patenting behavior. 
A.  Administrative Changes 
Because patent quality has topped many lists of problems with the 
patent system, patent offices (most especially the USPTO) have made 
a number of administrative adjustments to try to address the issue. 
1.  Increasing Examiner Headcount 
Prompted in large part by the rise in filings and apparent explo-
sion in pendency, the USPTO has hired many additional examiners.  
This has obviously required a substantial effort, including hiring and 
training thousands of new examiners, to say nothing of the ancillary 
resources dedicated to the project.  And yet, this effort has seen only 
modest results, even at the most basic level:  the presence of these ad-
ditional examiners, especially in the last two to three years, has effec-
tively returned the USPTO to the applications-to-examiner ratio wit-
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nessed in the mid-1990s (which itself is not generally considered to be 
a golden era for patent quality).  All the while, of course, pendency 
has continued to rise. 
Figure 4:  Patent Examiners per 1000 Applications Filed  
(U.S. & Japan), 1996–200759
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Importantly, a comparative look at the ratio of other national pat-
ent offices (Figure 4) suggests that there may be only limited gains in 
quality when increasing examiner headcount.  For example, although 
the Japan Patent Office ( JPO) has about one-third fewer examiners 
per application than the USPTO, there is a widespread perception 
that patent quality in Japan is at least equal to—if not better than—
that in the United States.  Further, given the scale of the recent in-
creases in filings and pendency, and assuming that these roughly con-
tinue, even keeping the application-to-examiner ratio steady will con-
sume enormous amounts of resources over the next several years.  It 
59 For the USPTO data, see USPTO Annual Reports, supra note 19.  For the JPO 
data, see Trilateral Statistical Reports, supra note 46. 
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thus seems implausible that we can make significant gains in patent 
quality merely by hiring more examiners. 
2.  Improving Search Tools 
Evaluating a patent application against the standards of pat-
entability presents serious information problems because it requires 
examiners to identify the most relevant concepts in the prior art and 
then evaluate whether the pending application is novel and nonobvi-
ous.  Moreover, as technology in many areas becomes increasingly in-
tegrated, the problem of finding the best-possible prior art has be-
come increasingly difficult.  Accordingly, a major effort has been 
made to improve patent offices’ search technologies and processes, 
such as by the deployment of electronic search tools.  The Japanese 
have even gone beyond implementing new search technology, out-
sourcing the majority of searches to private organizations, including a 
nonprofit agency dedicated to performing these searches.60
3.  Institutionalizing Patent Quality 
As the issue of patent quality has come to the attention of observ-
ers’ and policymakers, patent offices have begun to institutionalize 
patent-quality efforts by forming internal offices that are tasked with 
assessing and disseminating information about patent quality.  In the 
United States, such an office has been in operation for several years; 
in Japan, this type of office was created in July 2008.  Unfortunately, 
relatively little of the work done in these offices reveals substantial 
progress on patent quality.  In the United States, the quality-
management office reports that the rate of high-quality examination is 
around ninety-five percent—a number that many observers find either 
dubious or useless as an actual metric of quality.61
60 JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, at 44-45 (noting that, in fiscal year 
(FY) 2007, the JPO outsourced 79.3% of all prior art searches).  There are eight “regis-
tered search organizations” in Japan, though one (a nonprofit foundation) conducts 
the bulk of the searches.  Id.
61 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 5 (citing this statistic as proof that 
“[s]earching and examination continued to show quality improvement” in FY 2008). 
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4.  Broadening Public Access to Prosecution 
Traditionally, the patent-prosecution process has been a secretive 
affair between the applicant and the assigned examiner.  Increasingly, 
however, more access to the prosecution process is being offered to 
the public.  Most patent applications, even if pending, are published 
eighteen months after filing.  New inter partes reexamination pro-
ceedings allow third parties to be involved in reexamination,62 and 
there has been a move to increase the ability of third parties to submit 
information to examiners during prosecution.  Further, the USPTO 
has been engaged in a pilot test of the Community Patent Project, 
which seeks to engage interested outsiders in assisting examiners, es-
pecially with searches for prior art.63
5.  Postgrant Review 
Finally, serious proposals have been made to incorporate a form 
of postgrant review into the U.S. patent system (similar to mechanisms 
already in place in Japan and Europe).64  Postgrant review allows third 
parties to effectively extend the prosecution phase of a recently 
granted patent and is premised on the idea that market actors will be 
best positioned to determine which patents warrant further review 
and will be good sources of relevant information.  In the United States, 
the details surrounding the implementation of a postgrant review sys-
tem have been controversial, but the odds seem good that the United 
States will eventually follow Japan and Europe in this direction. 
62 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006) (providing for the Patent Office Director to 
conduct inter partes reexamination of a patent upon the request of a third party); see
also Stephen G. Kunin & Anton W. Fetting, The Metamorphosis of Inter partes Reexamina-
tion, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 973 (2004) (noting that “third parties have a limited 
pre-grant opportunity to protest or oppose issuance of a patent”). 
63 See Peer to Patent, Community Patent Review, http://www.peertopatent.org/ 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (describing how the website “opens the patent examination 
process to public participation”). 
64 See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 6(e) (2007) (proposing 
procedures for postgrant review of patents).  But see Biotechnology Indus. Org., Op-
pose New Postgrant Review Provision Which Allows Limitless Administrative Patent 
Challenges, http://www.bio.org/ip/domestic/postgrant.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 
2009) (opposing postgrant review on five grounds, including the possibility that com-
petitors will not mount a postgrant challenge right away but rather will wait “until the 
economic stakes are high, and use evidence discovered during the proceeding as ‘am-
munition’ for legal arguments” in district court litigation). 
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B.  Reforming the Prosecution Process 
A second set of proposed reforms is more squarely directed at the 
prosecution process itself.  Proposals to outsource some or all of the 
prosecution process have been around for some time; I noted above 
that Japan has outsourced most searching functions for the past sev-
eral years.65  Professors Lemley, Lichtman, and Sampat have proposed 
that a system be established whereby patentees can choose to “gold-
plate” their patents—that is, seek a more exacting form of validity 
analysis than would be typical today.66  Patents granted under a stan-
dard of heightened scrutiny would have the benefit of a stronger “pre-
sumption of validity” than others, and would also convey an important 
signal about their validity.67  In a similar vein, Professors Abramowicz 
and Duffy have proposed allowing patentees to choose alternative 
patent-prosecution venues, which would end the USPTO’s monopoly 
over granting patent rights in the United States.68  Both of these aca-
demic proposals are aimed at harnessing a patentee’s private informa-
tion about her inventions, as well as her sense of their ultimate value, 
to improve the prosecution process (and thereby, the idea goes, im-
prove patent quality as well). 
C.  Going in the Other Direction:  Patent Registration 
Finally, a third category of proposed reforms would effectively 
abandon the administrative effort to grant only valid patents, and in-
stead switch over to a registration system wherein patentees would file 
an application that would be granted by the USPTO after applying a 
relatively minimal level of scrutiny.  The strong form of this argument 
proposes that the scrutiny would only involve a review of the formali-
ties of the application (i.e., that all required components exist, are 
formatted properly, and so forth).  A weaker version would implement 
a “soft look” system that would entail a relatively quick and cursory re-
view of the application for basic validity requirements (e.g., whether 
the disclosure is clear and specific).  In either version, a registration 
65 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
66 Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do About Bad Patents?,
REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 12-13. 
67 Id.
68 See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1541, 1566-75 (2009) (addressing the possibilities of relying on foreign na-
tions’ patent determinations or permitting private firms to take on the burden of ex-
amining patents). 
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(or “registration-lite”) system would rely on a combination of private 
ordering and litigation to sort out valid from invalid patents.69  It 
would, of course, allow many more low-quality patents; on the other 
hand, it would reduce the enormous costs incurred by the USPTO’s 
examination apparatus.70  And, because relatively few patents have sig-
nificant economic impact in any event, there would perhaps be only 
modest increases in litigation.  Over time, service organizations would 
likely emerge to fill the void and provide assessments of patent quality.71
D.  The Weaknesses of These Approaches 
Each of these three distinct approaches—improving the adminis-
trative organization, altering the prosecution process, and abandon-
ing the prosecution process—have significant value.  Many of these 
ideas are uncontroversial:  improving the measurement and analysis of 
patent quality is clearly a good thing (though very difficult in prac-
tice); improving search tools is obviously helpful; using an outsourc-
ing approach for aspects of patent prosecution is likely to improve ef-
ficiency; and harnessing the private information of patent applicants 
should allow resources to be better allocated. 
Given the findings of Part II above, however, I am skeptical that 
any of these proposals will make a substantial improvement in patent 
quality.72  This skepticism is based on several reasons.  First, attempts 
at improving the administrative organization—that is, at improving 
the performance and efficiency of the PTO—suffer from real prob-
lems of scale.  As noted briefly above, merely keeping pace with in-
creased filings will create an enormous (and possibly unsustainable) 
drag on resources without clear evidence that such expenditures will 
improve pendency, much less patent quality.73  Similarly, I am skeptical 
69 See generally Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 2, at 70-74 (proposing use of the 
soft-look registration system in conjunction with the commercial-litigation system in 
order to reduce the current patent system’s significant social costs). 
70 See id. at 104 (“Under soft-look systems, especially the registration model, the 
private benefit an applicant would get from strategic games involving the filing of ex-
cessive variation in claims decreases.  At the same time, for those claims that happen to 
have appropriate scope, the public cost decreases and the public benefit increases.”). 
71 See id. at 121 & n.285 (analogizing to the rating organizations formed in securi-
ties markets). 
72 I set aside the patent registration approach for now, because that approach does 
not directly seek to improve patent quality. 
73 See discussion supra subsection III.A.1 (noting that the increase in the number 
of examiners at the PTO has merely returned the Office’s examiners-to-filings ratio to 
that of the mid-1990s). 
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that broadening public access (e.g., allowing additional third party sub-
missions, or implementing the Community Patent Project) will be scaled 
to anything near the size required to make a substantial contribution to 
patent quality, although these are each likely to be modestly helpful. 
A second major problem is that none of these proposals is very 
likely to alter the basic incentive structure that supports low-quality 
patenting behavior.  Gold-plating patents is a good idea, but to a con-
siderable degree patentees have already “voted with their feet” for the 
choice between high- and low-quality patents, and they have chosen 
the latter.  The benefits of a gold-plated patent could certainly be sub-
stantial, but as noted in Part II, the benefits of a low-quality patent are 
also powerful incentives.  Given the odds that a patent will actually be 
enforced, I doubt that a more robust presumption of validity will shift 
behavior any more than a much higher likelihood of validity does un-
der the current system.  And, as for the idea of selective prosecution, 
my analysis suggests that most patentees will likely choose a prosecu-
tion venue that offers speed and low cost even at the expense of thor-
oughness.  That is, to a substantial degree, patentees already choose be-
tween higher-cost, lower-volume, higher-quality patents on the one 
hand, and lower-cost, higher-volume, lower-quality patents on the 
other.  Thus, it seems quite unlikely that this proposal will change the 
fundamental analysis much. 
The basic problem with viewing patent quality as an administrative 
issue is that, given the incentives, there is relatively little that the 
USPTO (or any patent office) can do to change them.  First, as long as 
the balance of interests tips in favor of high-volume, low-quality pat-
enting behavior, we should expect to see those sorts of patents irre-
spective of the administrative process used.  Second, in a great many 
cases, the die is cast with respect to a patent’s quality by the time that 
the application is filed:  either the application has been drafted care-
fully and with a scope commensurate with the disclosed idea, or it has 
not; either a robust prior art search was conducted, and the patent 
was drafted with this knowledge, or it was not.  To be sure, the USPTO 
will (and is required to) conduct its own search and make its own 
evaluation of the application, but the USPTO is inherently under-
informed, severely resource constrained, and typically ignorant of im-
portant features of the application (such as its definition of the 
claims).  There are real limits to how much quality the USPTO can 
“add” to a filed application:  it can reject claims or request revisions, 
but the power of language remains in the patentee’s hands.  In patent 
prosecution, it will often be a case of “garbage-in, garbage-out”:  if the 
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filed application is low quality, the chances are that any granted pat-
ent will be low quality as well. 
Accordingly, the focus on the administrative aspects of patent 
quality is misguided.  Although unlikely to be harmful (and perhaps 
modestly helpful), such efforts are exceedingly unlikely to make any 
significant improvement in overall patent quality. 
IV. AN INCENTIVES-BASED APPROACH TO 
ADDRESSING PATENT QUALITY
Perhaps the most important finding reported in this Article is that 
the mechanisms that underlie patent quality—that is, the incentives 
that encourage a patentee to file too many patent applications with 
too little attention to quality—are both remarkably durable and exist 
prior to, and largely independent of, the prosecution process.  Any 
truly effective responses, then, will have to both directly address the 
incentive structure and be rather forceful in order to overcome the 
range of strong incentives that now operate on patentees. 
The problem, of course, is that devising a strategy that seems likely 
to actually improve patent quality—that is, one that directly alters the 
incentive structure and is robust enough to change behavior—raises 
other concerns.  Such a scheme is likely to have their own costs, rais-
ing the question of where patent quality ranks on the scale of prob-
lems to be addressed.  For example, one straightforward way to incen-
tivize higher patent quality is to make patents much harder and more 
costly to obtain.  But, of course, this has other significant effects, in-
cluding a disincentive for inventors to obtain patents altogether.  The 
key question, then, is whether relatively modest reforms can be 
made—reforms that address the incentive structure of patent quality, 
but have relatively small spillover effects.  While it seems wise to be 
relatively modest about the possibility of success, it seems to me that 
the basic strategy is clear:  focus on reforms that increase the incen-
tives to file high-quality patent applications, decrease the incentives to 
file low-quality applications, or both. 
I have divided the discussion below so that it roughly corresponds 
to the three major incentive effects that I noted above. 
A.  Encouraging Early Clarity 
As I noted in Section II.A, one of the major mechanisms support-
ing low-quality-patenting behavior is the advantage for patentees in 
deferring identification of their patents for as long as possible.  For 
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the strategic patentee, avoiding clearly defining the scope of the pat-
ented invention offers a number of important advantages, including 
minimizing up-front risks while preserving critical flexibility in patent 
scope over time. 
There are a number of ways to encourage clearly written patent 
disclosures and claims, and prevent the “nose of wax” problem that 
plagues patent litigation.  The key component in these responses is 
the minimization of the differences between the two phases of patent 
validity analysis—prosecution and litigation.  That is, if a patent’s 
meaning and scope were truly fixed at an early stage, then the advan-
tages of deferring clarity would be reduced or eliminated. 
One potentially fruitful area of experimentation would require 
the USPTO to conduct much more thorough claim-construction 
analyses—perhaps even drafting an administrative opinion on claim 
scope—defining key terms according to public reference works.  Pro-
fessor Petherbridge has made the case for such a system in an earlier 
work.74  Note that this additional inquiry into claim scope may not 
greatly improve the Patent Office’s ability to evaluate validity.75  But 
that is not the intent, at least in this context.  The goal would be to fix 
the meaning of patent claims at as early a stage as possible, and to 
largely leave that early understanding intact.  That is, in tandem with 
the increased USPTO attention would be a diminished role for the 
courts in claim construction.  Ideally, the courts could largely defer to 
an administrative opinion on claim scope.  In terms of the incentive 
structures discussed above, this change would shift the locus of de-
tailed scope analysis to earlier in time, thus diminishing both the abil-
ity for patentees to defer clarity as well as the benefits of doing so. 
Admittedly, the primary advantage of such a change is also its big-
gest weakness:  shifting patent-scope analysis to earlier in time has im-
portant costs, and will not resolve all ambiguity surrounding a patent 
by any means.  For the same reasons that deferring clarity is advanta-
geous for the patents, shifting scope analysis to earlier places signifi-
cantly more risk on the patentee, requiring earlier decisions that are 
74 See Petherbridge, supra note 11, at 196 (noting that this procedural change 
would be “specifically directed to increasing the amount of information in the public 
administrative record that is precisely targeted to defining the boundaries of the pat-
ented property”). 
75 Though it seems unlikely to hurt.  See id. at 206 (“The combination of better 
knowledge concerning the boundaries of the property being examined, and [the re-
sulting] more efficient search for prior art should result in an improved likelihood that 
the Patent Office will make the correct decision on patentability.”). 
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made with less information about future technology, markets, and 
competitor behavior.  On the one hand, this is the point—deferring 
clarity allows patentees to externalize these risks—but the net effect 
will be to make patents a less advantageous mechanism for protecting 
innovation.  Further, it is entirely possible that even the USPTO’s 
more detailed analysis of the patent’s scope will not actually resolve 
ambiguities:  a dispute during later litigation might just be concerned 
with the interpretation of the administrative scope determination in-
stead of the actual words of the claim.  Both of these concerns are well 
founded, I think.  My own sense is that this reform would make a posi-
tive difference, but by no means would it resolve all problems. 
Another approach to combat the incentive to defer clarity is to 
create disincentives for patentees to make significant alterations in 
claim scope during the prosecution process.  As I have argued before, 
jurisprudential doctrines such as prosecution history estoppel, which 
eliminates or substantially limits the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents (and thus patent scope) when patentees amend their claims 
during prosecution, provide important incentives for patentees to draft 
clear, coherent, and appropriate claims.76  By imposing a penalty when 
patent scope is altered, the law can strongly encourage early clarity. 
The costs of this approach are similar to the proposal described 
above.  First, and most simply, it imposes significant costs on patent-
ees, and might undermine the basic incentives to seek patents.  Sec-
ond, penalizing amendments during prosecution will discourage such 
amendments, and amendments are often desirable in this context be-
cause they make patents more likely to comport with standards of pat-
entability.  Third, by discouraging patent applicants from accepting 
the requests for amendments from patent examiners, it is likely to ex-
tend the time and cost of the prosecution phase, and thereby increase 
the workload at the Patent Office.77  The question, of course, is 
76 See Wagner, supra note 11, at 232-39 (describing the benefits of a strong form of 
prosecution history estoppel doctrine). 
77 An additional problem with this proposal is that, unfortunately, the Supreme 
Court has limited the application of the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.  See
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737-41 (2002) 
(holding that, where an amendment cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering an 
equivalent that was unforeseeable at the time of application, and where claims of 
equivalence only have a tangential relation to the reason that the amendment was sub-
mitted, the presumption that prosecution history estoppel prohibits a finding of 
equivalence can be rebutted).  However, the Federal Circuit has increasingly used 
closely related doctrines such as “disavowal” or “prosecution disclaimer” to similar ef-
fect. See, e.g., Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Having dis-
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whether the costs of the proposal outstrip the advantages.  My view is 
that in the longer term, as patentees adjust to a penalty regime, they 
will work harder to file applications that are higher quality and re-
quire less amendments.  If true, then many of the costs should dimin-
ish over time.78
Weakening the presumption of validity is another possible way to 
address the incentive to defer clarity.  That is, one of the reasons that 
patentees are encouraged to defer clarity is that the standards by 
which patents are evaluated for validity change over time:  during liti-
gation, the presumption of validity places the burden on a challenger 
to prove the invalidity of the patent.  As I noted in Part II, this means 
that patents that are granted even when they do not meet the stan-
dards for validity have a greater chance of being found “not invalid” in 
later litigation, thus encouraging weak patenting behavior.  If the pre-
sumption of validity were weakened or eliminated, this benefit of de-
ferring clarity would disappear.  The downside, of course, is that this 
change would weaken patents, and in some sense diminish the value 
of the USPTO’s administrative processes.  Further, given the several 
other benefits of deferring clarity, I am skeptical that this change itself 
would have much effect. 
B.  Addressing Feedback (Portfolio) Effects 
The next major set of incentives I outlined in Part II dealt with 
feedback effects:  the encouragement to seek more low-quality patents 
because so many low-quality patents already exist.  In prior work, I 
identified important advantages to obtaining large collections of pat-
ents (portfolios), even at the expense of patent quality.79  The adop-
tion by some in the patent system of a high-volume, low-quality strat-
egy further encourages that behavior by others:  if patent portfolios 
avowed coverage of [certain] devices . . . the patentee cannot reclaim that surrendered 
claim coverage by invoking the doctrine of equivalents.”); Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek 
Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that the doctrine of prosecution 
disclaimer is a “fundamental precept in our claim construction jurisprudence”). 
78 See Wagner, supra note 11, at 222-25 (arguing that “an information-forcing pen-
alty default rule” can be used to force patentees to internalize the costs of strategically 
underproducing relevant information, thereby eventually reducing the costs imposed 
upon society). 
79 See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 19, at 31-43 (explaining the advantages 
of patent portfolios). 
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are the way to maximize returns from the patent system, then we can 
expect that strategy to become more popular over time.80
It is difficult to craft reform to reverse these incentives.  As I 
briefly noted above, one straightforward approach is to simply make 
patents significantly more costly, thereby increasing the costs of a port-
folio strategy.81  Another approach, which Professor Parchomovsky 
and I briefly touched upon in Patent Portfolios, is to directly limit the 
number of patents granted (or applications filed), perhaps by adopt-
ing a series of yearly quotas or tradable patent-application rights.82
Much like increasing the direct cash costs of patenting, such a system 
would have the effect of making a portfolio-driven strategy much more 
difficult to implement, if not impossible altogether.  As we concluded in 
Patent Portfolios, the options for effectively diminishing the incentives to 
create patent portfolios are limited, and in some cases, the possible so-
lutions seem likely to be as harmful as the problem itself.83
C.  Addressing Administrative Incentives 
In Section II.B, I sketched a series of administrative incentives that 
together serve to encourage low patent quality.84  These include the ris-
ing number of filings that pressure the USPTO to issue patents quickly 
(so as to diminish backlog), as well as the inherent biases of specialized 
regulators and courts, which might tend to place the interests of repeat 
players in the patent system over those of the public at large. 
Several scholars have proposed ways to address the inherent ad-
ministrative incentives, including rethinking the Federal Circuit as a 
specialized court85 and offering additional administrative power to the 
80 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
81 See supra p. 131. 
82 See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 19, at 67-68 (describing the potential 
costs and benefits of implementing a mandatory “cap” on the number of patents com-
panies can hold).  Professors Parchomovsky and Ayres have also proposed a system of 
tradable patent rights, which they argue would reduce the number of patents.  See gen-
erally Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 
881-90 (2007). 
83 See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 19, at 66-74 (addressing the cost and 
inadequacy of various policy options seeking to combat patent portfolios). 
84 See supra Section II.B. 
85 See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1642-50 (2007) (describing the Federal Circuit’s problem of 
overcentralization of appellate jurisdiction and arguing for “an institutional structure 
that is more atomistic”). 
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USPTO.86  Because I do not think that the administrative incentives are 
the most important causal factor determining low patent quality, I am 
skeptical that any of those proposals would have a relevant effect on this 
paper (though they might well have important impacts in other areas). 
As for the increasing number of filings, I noted above that it seems 
very unlikely that we can simply hire more examiners to address this 
long-term trend.87  Many of the same proposals I noted with respect to 
the portfolio incentives (e.g., increasing the costs of obtaining patents 
or directly limiting their numbers) would impose substantial costs of 
their own in addressing this problem.88
D.  Penalizing Bad Patents 
One additional way to address the problem of low-quality patents 
is to impose significant penalties upon the holders of such patents.  
Because this approach would directly target the undesired behavior 
identified above as the key to low patent quality—the filing of low-
quality patent applications—this approach appears to be quite promis-
ing.  But two conceptual difficulties emerge at once.  First, there is the 
problem of “powering up” these penalties; after all, there already is a 
penalty for holding a low-quality patent, insofar as the patent will be 
invalidated if subjected to litigation.89  But, as I demonstrated in sub-
section I.B.4, this penalty appears woefully inadequate to deter low-
quality-filing behavior:  its application is probabilistic,90 and the simple 
elimination of the low-quality patent is an insufficient cost to the hold-
ing patentee to deter strategic portfolio behavior.  Thus, a penalty 
scheme would have to be devised that would impose costs far greater 
than simply the loss of the invalid patent. 
The second conceptual difficulty is in determining when to apply 
these penalties.  Professors Abramowicz and Duffy, in their contribu-
86 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 317-30 (2007) (proposing 
patent reform via the administrative law avenue of providing a more deferential stan-
dard of review to decisions of the USPTO). 
87 See supra subsection III.A.1. 
88 See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
89 In addition, a requirement to pay maintenance fees on invalid (but not-yet-
adjudged-so) patents would work a cash loss on such patentees as well, thus providing 
another form of penalty. 
90 The risk that a patent will be litigated is on the order of one percent.  Lemley, 
supra note 10, at 1507. Factor in the difficulty of proving a patent invalid (due to the 
presumption of validity and expense of litigation), and the probability of even an inva-
lid patent being declared invalid would be substantially less than one percent. 
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tion on this issue, have proposed that the USPTO randomly select pat-
ents to evaluate their validity, and that penalties for invalid patents be 
applied on that basis.91  This would raise the expected rate of screen-
ing.  Further, oppositional procedures such as reexamination and 
postgrant review (if instituted) could be used to generate validity rul-
ings.  This combination—litigation, random selection, and opposi-
tional proceedings—should raise the expected rate of screening to a 
level at which patent holders would take notice. 
We thus return to the question of penalties.  As noted above, simple 
invalidation of the patent is not enough.  The most promising avenues 
here appear to be two-fold:  cash fines and “infectious invalidity.” 
Because they are straightforward, I will explore fines first.  The idea 
is that a patentee would owe fines, likely paid to the government, that 
would significantly outstrip the losses associated with the loss of the pat-
ent.  Obviously, assessing fines properly is important—set them too low, 
and the deterrence effects are too small; set them too high, and the in-
centives to patent could be diminished.  Again, Professors Duffy and 
Abramowicz offer a possible path.92  Assuming the level of fines could 
be set appropriately, this would be a straightforward penalty to assess. 
A second possible option is what I call “infectious invalidity”:  the 
invalidity of a patent can spread to related patents held by the same 
assignee, thereby rendering them invalid.  A similar doctrine—
infectious unenforceability—is well established in the patent law, 
holding that inequitable conduct will “infect” related patents, also 
holding them unenforceable.93  This penalty would—like the direct 
cash fines—greatly outstrip the loss of the invalid patent.  How much 
of an incentive effect it would have is hard to predict.  On the one 
hand, the loss of multiple patents could work a devastating blow on a 
patentee’s strategic goals.  On the other, a patentee engaging in a 
widespread practice of filing low-quality patents might be only mini-
mally deterred, because even a group of patents would have relatively 
91 Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 68, at 1587-93.  Their focus is on measures to 
police poor quality prosecution providers rather than patentees themselves, but there 
is of course no reason that the basic structure of their approach could not be applied 
here.
92 See id. at 1576-1601 (discussing fines based on multiples of patenting fees and 
other possible approaches). 
93 See, e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (noting that “inequitable conduct in procuring one patent-in-suit requires a 
holding that the other patents-in-suit are unenforceable”). 
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limited value.  On balance, the cash-fine approach seems to be a safer 
bet, albeit one with difficulties surrounding the level of the fine. 
*      *      * 
As I noted at the outset of this Section, my analysis has demon-
strated that the mechanisms supporting low patent quality are wide-
spread and powerful and in many ways inherent in the modern patent 
system.  It should come as little surprise, then, that I doubt that any 
one reform is likely to change patenting behavior much.  There are 
certainly more radical approaches—we could limit patenting to 
100,000 filings per year, for example, and raise direct costs ten-fold—
that would plainly have some impact.  But they would also have serious 
(and probably negative) effects on the basic incentive structure of the 
patent system—effects large enough to swamp any losses from low-
quality patents.  Under these circumstances, the best option seems to 
be trying to muddle through, using relatively modest reforms to try to 
adjust some of the incentives that lead to poor patent quality, while 
recognizing the limits of what can be accomplished.  In particular, I 
think that the proposals addressing the incentives to defer clarity (fix-
ing patent scope early) are the most directly targeted, and seem likely 
to have the best probability of success without serious side effects.94
CONCLUSION
There is perhaps no patent issue with a higher profile than patent 
quality—nor one with more widespread agreement that improvement 
is needed.  Yet little attention has been paid to carefully teasing out 
the mechanisms that have led us to the point where there is near-
universal agreement about the problem of poor patent quality. 
This Article has attempted to begin filling this gap by explaining 
that the problem of low patent quality is not one of poor administra-
tive performance on the part of the USPTO and its colleagues world-
wide, but rather one of incentives.  That is, the reason that we have 
low patent quality is because the incentives to file low-quality patents 
are too high, and the incentives to file high-quality patents are too 
low.  Patent quality is low primarily because of decisions made by pat-
entees choosing to trade volume for quality in patenting, seeking to 
maximize return from their patents, or simply aiming to save costs.  By 
94 See supra Section IV.A. 
2009] Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms 2173
outlining the various incentive structures at work, a much more com-
plete picture of the problem of low patent quality comes into focus. 
Unfortunately, the picture that emerges suggests rather strongly 
that patent quality is far from an easy problem to fix, and in many 
cases the cures may be worse than the problem itself.  In particular, we 
should not expect reforms that focus on enhancing the quality of the 
patent-prosecution process to bear much fruit—patent quality is a 
matter in the hands of patentees, and as long as the incentives operate 
to encourage low quality, we should not expect anything different, no 
matter how much more effective the USPTO becomes.  Although I 
suggest that modest reforms might serve to alter patenting behavior, I 
ultimately conclude that there is no easy answer or simple fix.  But at 
least if we understand the problem fully—here, the mechanisms that 
underlie low-quality patents—we can begin to address it, and, more 
importantly, avoid making changes that will only make matters worse. 
